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Report of the Coalition for a New America: 
Platform Section on Communications 
Policy* 
Rodney A. Smollat 
INTRODUCTION: THE COALITION FOR A NEW AMERICA 
It is 1996, and frustration in American society has reached a 
critical mass. Despite the promises of prior elections, there is a 
mounting federal deficit; a sluggish economy; high unemployment; 
increasing violent crime; alarming drug use, particularly among the 
nation's youth; spreading HIV -related deaths; and cities across the 
nation have been beset by episodes of racial and ethnic violence, 
often as severe as the Los Angeles riots following the 1992 Rodney 
King verdict. There is a growing sense that American society is 
careening out of control. The public mood is almost desperate. 
Against this backdrop, a nonpartisan coalition of prominent 
American citizens has formed a new political party called the "Co-
alition For A New America" (the "Coalition"). The Coalition is 
comprised of successful leaders from business, science, philosophy, 
medicine, law, divinity, journalism, and education-but not polit-
ics. Indeed, the Coalition has disqualified from leadership roles all 
career politicians, persons currently holding public office, and pro-
fessional political advisors and pollsters. The Coalition launched 
its entry onto the American political scene by commissioning a se-
ries of "Coalition Task Force" studies to reexamine all major com-
ponents of existing American society and to suggest a comprehen-
sive and meaningful restructuring of existing American public 
policies and institutions. The various task force reports were 
melded into a general party platform (the "Coalition Platform") 
* Editors' Note: The following article presents a fictional futuristic "thought 
experiment" posed by Professor Rodney A. Smolla. The views expressed by the "Coalition 
for a New America," and witnesses who appeared to testify in proceedings conducted by the 
Coalition, may or may not be those of Professor Smolla. Any resemblance to real persons or 
events is purely coincidental. 
t Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
College of William and Mary. This paper was presented at the University of Chicago Legal 
Forum Symposium in October 1992. 
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that formed the Coalition's blueprint for fundamental changes in 
the basic infrastructure of American society. 
Many of the sweeping changes suggested by the Coalition's 
platform would require changes in the United States Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Coalition Platform calls for convening a new Con-
stitutional Convention with a mandate to consider whatever 
changes in the Constitution would be necessary to implement the 
Coalition's proposals. 
As the 1996 election approaches, the Coalition appears poised 
to accomplish one of the most dramatic "peacetime revolutions" in 
modern history. The Coalition Platform, published as a paperback 
book, is a best-seller. The Coalition has assembled a full slate of 
Coalition candidates for all pending state and federal offices. All 
Coalition candidates have pledged to try to implement the Coali-
tion Platform. 
One of the most significant components of the Coalition Plat-
form is its "Section on Communications." This section calls for a 
series of changes in American policies regarding the freedom of 
speech and of the press, many of which would require altering ex-
isting First Amendment doctrines and principles. The Section on 
Communications was written . by the Coalition's Task Force on 
Communications Policy, comprised of distinguished American bus-
iness leaders, philosophers, journalists, legal scholars, scientists, 
and educators with special interests in communications issues. The 
Task Force convened for several months in Chicago, Illinois (at the 
facilities of the University of Chicago) to formulate the Coalition's 
policies on communications matters. 
The following memorandum presents a summary of the Coali-
tion Platform's Section on Communications. 
MEMORANDUM 
SUMMARY OF THE COALITION PLATFORM 
SECTION ON COMMUNICATIONS 
In the course of its deliberations, the Coalition Task Force on 
Communications Policy heard the testimony of many experts on 
free speech and press, including several representatives of the 
institutional press. The Coalition Platform contains substantial 
annotations noting that testimony, including discussions of legal 
and policy arguments made by the institutional press that the Coa-
lition subsequently rejected. This memorandum summarizes testi-
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mony before the Task Force and the Task Force's recommenda-
tions, and reproduces excerpts of the testimony where appro-
priate.1 
PREFACE 
The Coalition Task Force on Communications Policy is 
acutely conscious of the legacy of the "Hutchins Commission," the 
popular name for the "Commission on Freedom of the Press," 
chaired by University of Chicago Chancellor Robert Maynard 
Hutchins during the 1940s. In 1947, the Hutchins Commission 
published a report entitled A Free and Responsible Press (the 
"Hutchins Commission Report"). 2 The Coalition Platform is in 
many respects an update of the basic philosophical principles ar-
ticulated by the Hutchins Commission Report. 8 
' The Coalition Platform is far too lengthy to reproduce in its entirety. In order to 
provide the reader with the full flavor of the Coalition's agenda, this memorandum repro-
duces all of the Coalition Platform's major proposals concerning speech and press. However, 
only selected portions of the proposals, including selected excerpts from the Coalition's an-
notations to its recommendations, are reproduced here. 
• Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of 
Chicago Press, 1947) ("Hutchins Report"). The Commission was chaired by Hutchins; the 
Vice-Chair was Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a noted First Amendment scholar and Professor of 
Law at Harvard Law School. The other members were: John M. Clark, an economist; John 
Dickinson, a law professor and General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad; William Ear-
nest Hocking, a philosopher; Harold D. Lasswell, a law professor; Archibald ·MacLeish, a 
poet, lawyer, and former Assistant Secretary of State; Charles E. Merriam, a political scien-
tist; Reinhold Neibuhr, a philosopher; Robert Redfield, an anthropologist; Beardsley Ruml, 
Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Arthur M. Schlesinger, a historian; and 
George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College. 
Throughout this article, the views of the Hutchins. Commission and its report are re-
ferred to as those of the "Hutchins Commission" or the "Commission." The Hutchins Com-
mission's findings should be kept distinct from the views of the Coalition Task Force, which 
are referred to as the recommendations of the "Coalition" or the "Coalition Platform." 
• The Coalition Task Force notes, with admiration and approval, the work of Professor 
Lee Bollinger, particularly his book Images of a Free Press. See Lee C. Bollinger, Images of 
a Free Press (University of Chicago Press, 1991). The Coalition Task Force describes 
Images of a Free Press as a critical examination of the "central image" of the American 
ideal of freedom of the press, an image crystallized by the Supreme Court's opinion in New 
York Times Co. u Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). See, generally, Anthony Lewis, Make No 
Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (Random House, 1991). Bollinger's book 
argues that this traditional image of the press and the First Amendment model of press 
freedom that emanates from it ought to be replaced by a more sophisticated imagery, one 
that incorporates a model of public discourse that places a greater premium on enhancing 
the quality of public discussion and decision-making. In Bollinger's view, public institu-
tions-including the legal system-have a constructive role to play in improving the tenor of 
this public debate. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 23. Bollinger suggests that a new 
"Hutchins Commission" be convened in the 1990s to reexamine the current state of the 
press and press law in light of the rich body of experience, court decisions, and legal scholar-
ship that has been generated since 1947. "Much has changed in the quarter century since 
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It should be stated at the outset that censorship is not tolera-
ble in a free society. Accordingly, the Coalition's broad outline of 
suggested reforms must, when actually drafted as legislation and 
regulations, be carefully crafted so as to preserve free speech and 
press to the greatest extent possible. 
Many thoughtful witnesses who testified before the Task 
Force advised using extreme caution in any attempt to regulate the 
communications marketplace. For example, one witness pointed 
out that it is almost impossible to predict how new communica-
tions technologies will evolve or what the social impact of such new 
technologies will be:' Several witnesses noted that new communi-
cations technologies almost always trigger a social impulse to cen-
sor.'1 Historically, technological innovations in communications 
have revolutionized both law and policy, often triggering cycles of 
robust free expression followed by official regulation or censorship, 
the [Hutchins] Commission's report, and today the most important matters calling for in-
vestigation are of a kind best suited to the perspective of a disinterested and independent 
commission." Id at 135. The Coalition is proud to take up Professor Bollinger's challenge. 
• See, generally, M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of 
Law (Oxford University Press, 1989). Professor Katsh writes: 
One of the clear lessons of the history of printing is that we should be extremely 
wary of assuming that the early form of a new technology will be the same as the 
mature or developed form. The first printed books, for example, looked very much 
like manuscripts. The typeface used was similar to a written script .... We are 
still in an age in which video tries to emulate film while much of what emanates 
from computers strives to be similar to print. For example, desktop-publishing 
programs take pride in their ability to duplicate traditional typefaces. Word-
processing programs feature justified margins to make the output from "printers" 
look more printlike. History is, in a sense, repeating itself as the technology 
stresses its ability to produce a product that looks familiar. The new technology 
seems to be able to do what the old did but with greater efficiency and at lower 
cost. 
Id at 260-61. 
• In the prescient words of Ithiel de Sola Pool: 
Civil liberty functions today in a changing technological context. For five hundred 
years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries won, for the right of people to 
speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled. But new tech-
nologies of electronic communication may now relegate old and freed media such 
as pamphlets, platforms, and periodicals to a corner of the public forum. Elec-
tronic modes of communication that enjoy lesser rights are moving to center stage. 
The new communication technologies have not inherited all the legal immunities 
that were won for the old. When wires, radio waves, satellites, and computers be-
came major vehicles of discourse, regulation seemed to be a technical necessity. 
And so, as speech increasingly flows over those electronic media, the five-century 
growth of an unabridged right of citizens to speak without controls may be 
endangered. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 1 (Belknap Press, 1983). 
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followed in turn by protest and eloquent pleas for freedom. 8 For 
· example, governments around the world reacted to Gutenberg's 
new printing press by indulging in the impulse to censor,7 and a 
series of British licensing laws provoked John Milton to write his 
famous tract on free expression, Areopagitica.8 
Having said all of this, however, the Coalition has come to the 
conclusion that American society must come to a new understand-
ing of what is meant by freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press. Quoting Charles Beard, the Hutchins Commission described 
what it clearly thought was an outmoded notion of freedom of the 
press: "'[l]n its origin, freedom of the press had little or nothing to 
do with truth telling .... Most of the early newspapers were parti-
san sheets devoted to savage attacks on party opponents. . . . 
Freedom of the press means the right to be just or unjust, partisan 
or non-partisan, true or false, in news column or editorial col-
umn.' "9 The Hutchins Commission offered an alternative vision: 
Today, this former legal privilege wears the aspect of so-
cial irresponsibility. The press must know that its faults 
and errors have ceased to be private vagaries and have 
become public dangers. Its inadequacies menace the bal-
ance of public opinion. It has lost the common and an-
• The Roman censors who, in addition to the mundane administrative matters of state, 
had charge of the superintendence·of public morals, found it only natural to persecute the 
fledgling Christian church, an upstart threatening good Roman morality. Those abused as 
children often become abusers as adults, and the Roman Catholic Church, in its stodgy 
middle age, became a vengeful censor. The Church banned "heresy" (a word with an inter-
esting etymology, derived from the Greek word for "choice") by prohibiting "choice" on 
matters of faith and morals, punishing the heretical choosers with everything from excom-
munication to execution. Censorship was logistically simple for the early Roman censors and 
Roman Catholic Church because handwritten books were laboriously produced by a small 
number of persons under the strict control of authority, leaving no opportunity for the mass 
distribution of printed material challenging the orthodoxy. In 1493 the Venice Inquisition 
issued the first list of banned books; in 1559 the Church established the Liborum Prohib-
itorum, or Index of Banned Books, binding on Roman Catholics (and thus virtually the 
entire population of Europe). The Index was administered by the Office of the lnqui~tion, 
which continued to operate in France as late as 177 4 and Spain as late as 1834. (Today there 
is no Inquisition but there is still an Index, though the Church now regards it as advisory 
only.) See Michael Scammell, Censorship and its History-A Personal View, in Kevin 
Boyle, ed, Article 19 World Report 1988: Information, Freedom and Censorship 2-3 (Article 
19, 1988). 
7 Shortly after Gutenberg invented the printing press in 1450, official authorities in-
vented the first censorship bureau. In 1485, only thirty-five years after Gutenberg made 
mass dissemination of the written word a technological possibility, the Archbishop of 
Mainz-the city where Gutenberg lived-created an office of the censor. Id at 3. 
• Id at 4. · 
• Hutchins Report, Appendix at 131 (cited in note 2), quoting Charles Beard, St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch Symposium on Freedom of the Press 13 (1938). 
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cient human liberty to be deficient in its function or to 
offer half-truth for the whole.10 
The Hutchins Commission did not call for government regula-
tion but instead warned of its coming. The Hutchins Commission 
argued that the press must become responsible or regulation would 
follow: "The legal right will stand if the moral right is realized or 
tolerably approximated."11 Convinced that the moral obligations 
contemplated by the Hutchins Commission have not been "tolera-
bly approximated," let alone "realized," the Coalition Task Force 
finds that the legal right can no longer stand.12 
I. FREEDOM oF SPEECH AND PRESS: A SuMMARY STATEMENT oF 
PRINCIPLE 
A central driving philosophy of the Coalition Platform is that 
the press should be an agent of elevation. The press should make 
us better-not just better informed, but better: better people liv-
ing in a better society.13 The press should help make us more civi-
lized, more thoughtful, more rational. 
What should American society ultimately expect and demand 
of the press? The Coalition Platform reaffirms the vision of the 
Hutchins Commission, which concludes that the press should 
provide 
first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account 
of the day's events in a context which gives them mean-
ing; second, a forum for the exchange of comment and 
criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions and 
attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; 
fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals 
and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching 
~ Hutchins Report, Appendix at 131 (cited in note 2). 
I d. 
•• Throughout its deliberations, the Coalition was presented with arguments by the 
press and others that the Coalition's proposals ran counter to First Amendment rights. 
When presented with evidence of instances of bad journalism, the reflexive response of jour-
nalists was often to cite the First Amendment, and its guarantee of a right to be wrong. 
Again, what we have here is a failure to communicate. For it is not a complete answer to the 
charge that one is wrong to respond that one has a right to be wrong. One may have a duty 
to be right even when there is a right to be wrong. And if the duty is systematically ignored, 
the contours of the right itself may be modified. 
•• See Hutchins Report at 4 (cited in note 2) ("[T]he press can do its duty by the new 
world that is struggling to be born. It can help create a world community by giving men 
everywhere knowledge of the world and of one another, by promoting comprehension and 
appreciation of the goals of a free society that shall embrace all men."). 
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every member of the society by the currents of informa-
tion, thought, and feeling which the press supplies.14 
155 
The recommendations of the Coalition Platform are intended to 
advance these objectives. 
The Coalition Platform calls for a redefinition of the American 
concept of "freedom." For the nation to survive, freedom can no 
longer be conceptualized. as the mere liberty to pursue selfish gain. 
Thus, the Coalition Task Force's conception of "freedom of the 
press," indeed its conception of "freedom" itself, is not the mini-
malist libertarian notion of freedom, as in "freedom from govern-
ment interference." The Coalition uses the phrase "freedom" in a 
manner that includes, within itself, a notion of virtue, of quality. 
In this respect the Coalition quite deliberately endorses the views 
of the Hutchins Commission. The Hutchins Commission entitled 
its report "A Free and Responsible Press," as if it understood 
"freedom" and "responsibility" as separate concepts in which one 
is related to the other through moral obligation (as in the familiar 
admonition, "with freedom comes responsibility").. Yet, the word 
"free," as used by the Hutchins Commission, has built within it 
something more than independence-indeed, the very opposite of 
independence-it has within it a sense of fulfillment that can come 
only through the vindication of obligation, obligation to one's self, 
to one's profession, to one's culture, to one's truth. 111 The time has 
come to view the matter not simply in terms of what the Constitu-
tion may do for the press, but what the press may do for the Con-
stitution.18 The time has come to view the matter not merely in 
14 Id at 20-21. When measured against these goals, the Hutchins Commission did not 
find the performance of the press very impressive: 
The news is twisted by the emphasis on firstness, on the novel· and sensational; by 
the personal interests of owners; and by pressure groups. Too much of the regular 
. output of the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of stories and images 
which have no relation to the typical lives of real people anywhere. Too often the 
result is meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and the perpetuation of misunder-
standing among widely scattered groups whose only contact is through these 
media. 
Id at 68. As is made clear throughout the Coalition Platform's Section on Communications, 
the quality of the press has deteriorated since the Hutchins Commission rather .than 
improved. 
•• In the words of the Bible, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you 
free." John 8:32. 
•• The Coalition proceeds from the major premise that the press should act as a cooper-
ating partner with government and other public institutions in the process of self-govern-
ance. The Coalition understands that this idea runs counter to the American press's tradi-
tion of independence and that the policy choices contained in its Platform would require 
rejecting or modifying a body of First Amendment jurisprudence. The amendments likely 
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terms of freedom for the press, but also as freedom from the 
press.17 
When the Hutchins Commission warned that "freedom of the 
press is in danger,"18 it did not refer simply to the "independence 
of the press": it meant that the soul of the press was in danger.19 
The Coalition endorses, and indeed expands upon, this argument. 
The Coalition Task Force Report is more than a baseless threat of 
legal sanction, more than "clean up your act or face regulation." 
The argument is more profound: The press must reform or lose its 
salvation, lose its reason for being, lose that which elevates and 
connects it to civilized life, lose that which makes it possible to call 
itself a profession. The Hutchins Commission hoped that the press 
would reform itself.20 That has not come to pass. The Supreme 
Court has, only on rare occasion, rendered decisions in which the 
First Amendment has not prevented punishing unethical journalis-
would include restrictions on disclosure of truthful information, despite the Supreme 
Court's heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such restrictions, at least as to 
non-participants in the proceedings. 
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829 (1978), for example, the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that made it a criminal offense to 
divulge information pertaining to disciplinary or ethical charges pending before Virginia's 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. In defiance of the law, a Virginia newspaper, the 
Virginian Pilot, published an accurate report of a pending commission inquiry and identi-
fied the state judge being investigated. Id at 840. 
Similarly, in Butterworth v Smith, 494 US 624 (1990), the Court struck down a Florida 
statute that, with certain narrow exceptions, prohibited a grand jury witness from disclosing 
testimony he or she gives before the grand jury. The sweep of the Florida grand jury secrecy 
law was extraordinary; the law barred disclosure of the "content, gist, or import" of the 
testimony permanently, even after the term of the grand jury had ended, unless the testi-
mony was disclosed in a court proceeding. See id at 627. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that prior to appearing before the 
grand jury, the witness "was free to speak at will." 494 US at 635. After an appearance, 
however, the witness is no longer free to disclose the "import or gist" of the testimony, and 
the ban extends into the indefinite future. Id. This, he said, was "dramatic." Id. Its "poten-
tial for abuse . . . through its employment as a device to silence those who know of unlawful 
conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent." ld at 635-36. 
The Coalition believes that the holdings of these cases should be rejected or modified as 
needed to permit the evolution of a more constructive partnership between the press and 
government. 
11 See Hutchins Report at 18 (cited in note 2) ("Freedom of the press means freedom 
from and freedom for."). 
18 See id at 1 ("The Commission set out to answer the question: Is the freedom of the 
press in danger? Its answer to that question is: Yes."). 
18 See id at 2 ("This danger in the case of the freedom of the press, is . . . in part the 
result of the failure of the directors of the press to recognize the press needs of a modern 
nation and to estimate and accept the responsibilities which these needs impose on them."). 
•• See id at 91 ("The Commission hopes that the press itself will recognize its public 
responsibility and obviate governmental action to enforce it."). 
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tic behavior. In Cohen v Cowles Media Co.,21 for example, the 
Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent an award of 
money damages to a source whose promise of confidentiality had 
been breached.22 The Coalition now intends to do what the Hutch-
ins Commission predicted might happen: engage the imagination 
of society and the force of law to reform the press. 23 Freedom of 
expression, as the Coalition Platform conceives it, is a moral right 
because it contains an element of duty. 2 ' 
The duty is something beyond self-interest, indeed beyond the 
immediate and obvious interests of the community: "It is the duty 
of the scientist to his result and of Socrates to his oracle; it is the 
duty of every man to his own belief."211 Because the moral right of 
free expression is grounded in the duty to the common good and in 
., 111 S Ct 2513 (1991). 
•• Many witnesses before the Coalition argued that the notion of freedom of press is 
broad enough to encompass discretion even to breach promises of confidentiality. The Coali-
tion carefully considered, for example, an argument offered by Professor William Van 
Alstyne: 
The determination of whether to keep a source confidential, as may have been 
promised or, despite that promise to include it as part of the published story, goes 
as much to the heart of editorial autonomy as any other decision a newspaper may 
make. The extent to which its judgment on such matters may or may not be re-
garded as fair to the informant does not make it any less a decision for the news-
paper to decide, nor different in kind from what was involved in the Tornillo case 
[Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241 (1974)]. There, too, one 
may agree or (as is more likely) disagree with the newspaper's decision on the 
merits but which decision the Court unanimously sustained as part of the freedom 
of the press. In Rhinehart [Seattle Times Co. v Rhinehart, 467 US 20 (1984)] the 
information was available due solely to a court order enabling the defendant to 
secure information it might legitimately need merely in preparing for trial, and 
accordingly within the court's authority to limit exclusively to that use. Here, 
however, when private parties deal with newspapers on their own initiative, they 
must necessarily understand that the risks they incur in doing so are ultimately 
risks to be resolved in the editorial room and not in the courts. 
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials Supp 1992 12-13 (Foun-
dation Press, 1992). 
•• The philosopher William Earnest Hocking, who served on the Hutchins Commission, 
claimed that "[l]aw is the great civilizing agent that it is ... because it is a working partner 
with the advancing sense of the community." William E. Hocking, Ways of Thinking About 
Rights: A New Theory of the Relation Between Law and Morals, in 2 Law: A Century of 
Progress 242, 258 (1937), quoted in Robert E. Drechsel, Media Ethics and Media Law: The 
Transformation of Moral Obligation into Legal Principle, 6 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub 
Policy 5 (1992). Hocking believed that because of the central role of the press in modern 
culture, the press had "lost the common and ancient human liberty to be deficient in its 
function .... " Hutchins Report at 131 (cited in note 2). 
•• See Hutchins Report at 8 (cited in note 2) (Freedom of expression "is a moral right 
because it has an aspect of duty about it.") . 
•• ld. 
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the integrity of an individual's own thought, the right is forfeited 
when these duties are ignored or rejected. 26 
. The Coalition heard testimony from many members of the 
press expressing outrage and resentment at what was perceived as 
the Coalition's conviction that American journalists do not com-
port themselves in a manner befitting a "profession," or that jour-
nalists as a group are amoral or unmindful of ethical restraints on 
their behavior. Witnesses pointed out that after the Watergate 
scandal, codes of ethics proliferated at American newspapers. 27 By 
the mid-1980s, more than half of all American newspapers had 
adopted such codes, and surveys indicated that over 60 percent of 
newspaper journalists at all levels favor written ethical codes. 28 · 
The Coalition Task Force also heard evidence that ethical issues 
are taken seriously. Nearly one-fourth of the managing editors in 
one survey indicated that they had fired someone for unethical be-
havior,29 and representatives from many news organizations testi-
fied that the ethos of their organizations included compassion and 
sensitivity.80 Other press witnesses criticized the Coalition for the 
"aura of moral certitude" that they perceived in many of the Coali-
tion's recommendations. Journalists, they argued, are constantly 
faced with ethical dilemmas in which the moral choices are highly 
ambigu~us. 81 
•• See id at 10 ("Hence, when ·the man who claims the moral right of free expression is 
a liar, a prostitute whose political judgments can be bought, a dishonest inflamer of hatred 
and suspicion, his claim is unwarranted and groundless."). 
17 See Douglas Anderson, How Managing Editors View and Deal with Ethical Issues, 
64 Journalism Q 341, 341-42 (1987) . 
. •• David Pritchard and Madelyn Peroni Morgan, Impact of Ethics Codes on Judg-
ments by Journalists: A Natural Experiment, 66 Journalism Q 934 (1989); Philip Meyer, 
Ethical Journalism 238 (Longman Publishing Group, 1987). 
•• Anderson, 64 Journalism Q at 344 (cited in note 27). 
•• Representatives from the Indianapolis Star, for example, cited the paper's ethics 
code, which instructs reporters: 
You must consider the effects on people's lives. Is the story important enough to 
warrant wrecking a person's reputation, or breaking up a home, or costing a job? 
These are editor's decisions, but reporters too must not lose their compassion in 
the quest for a story. 
Ethics Code of the Indianapolis Star, quoted in Pritchard & Morgan, 66 Journalism Q at 
936 (cited in note 28). 
•• Many press witnesses argued that they did not mean to suggest that deviation from 
ethical standards should never be punishable through legal sanctions. Many of these wit-
nesses took issue with the Coalition's characterization of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S Ct 2419 (1991), as an example of the "perver-
sity" of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Several press witnesses argued that no 
conscientious journalist would defend, on ethical grounds, the deliberate alterations of quo-
tations by a source or by the subject of a story in order to twist the meaning of the quote, 
sensationalize the quote, or otherwise alter in a material way the substance or tone of the 
149] COALITION FOR A NEW AMERICA 159 
The Coalition emphatically does not believe that journalists as 
a class are inherently less moral, less sensitive, or less compassion-
ate than other persons. The Coalition believes, however, that com-
petitive market pressures and general cultural forces have con-
spired to generate patterns of press behavior that have become 
increasingly inconsistent with the goals of a decent society and a 
progressive democracy. Journalists, like other professionals, may 
need the force of law to enforce ethical norms. As the Hutchins 
Commission observed, freedom of the press has never been thought 
to mean that the "general laws of the country" were inapplicable 
to the press. 32 "The First Amendment was intended to guarantee 
free expression, not to create a privileged industry."33 
In the Coalition Task Force's view, the press owes a fiduciary 
obligation to the marketplace of ideas.34 An idea should have its 
chance in the marketplace whether or not it is shared by those who 
own or manage the press, and whether or not it is popular with the 
rich or famous. 311 The Coalition Platform advances the notion that 
"ideas have standing." Ideas themselves have a right of access to 
the market, wholly aside from the speaker who expresses them.38 
quotation. Most journalists, on the other hand, would find no ethical difficulties in altering 
(by paraphrasing or editing) quotations in trivial or cosmetic ways, such as to correct foibles 
in syntax, spelling, or grammar, or to delete redundant or irrelevant phrases. They main-
tained that Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority in Masson, essentially placed the 
First Amendment standard into synchronization with the ethical standard by holding that 
proof of intentional alterations of quotations that defame the person quoted by materially 
changing the meaning of the quotation may be actionable under the First Amendment. See 
Masson, 111 S Ct at 2433. See also Cohen, 111 S Ct at 2518 ("[G]enerally applicable laws do 
not offenq the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."). Masson, these witnesses 
maintained, is an example of how current First Amendment jurisprudence actually-works 
well, permitting legal accountability for ethical deviations that reach the level of intentional 
falsification. 
•• Hutchins Report at 81 (cited in note 2) . 
•• ld . 
.. The Supreme Court has allowed the federal government to impose fairness require-
ments on broadcasters, viewing them as public trustees for the airwaves. See Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 (1969). The Coalition believes that the public trustee 
concept of Red Lion should be extended to all mass media, regardless of technical format. 
•• See Hutchins Report at 9 (cited in note 2). 
•• It should be noted, however, that like the Hutchins Commission, the Coalition Plat-
form does not believe that the classical "marketplace of ideas" metaphor supplies the exclu-
sive, indeed even the primary, justification for protection of freedom of speech and press. 
The Commission's conception of the value of free expression was expansive and not limited 
to the narrow idea that the "marketplace of ideas" would actually produce truth. The Com-
mission clearly saw free expression as valuable for reasons that go beyond the pursuit of 
truth, valuable because it fulfills the individual speaker and promotes a mentally robust 
public. See id. 
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Ideas matter.87 Ideas are what constitute a culture. And the press 
should exist, ultimately, for those ideas, and for the culture they 
comprise.88 
The Coalition rejects the theory that the press is bound by 
what it believes to be the interests and tastes of the mass audience, 
that the press cannot rise higher than these inter~sts and tastes 
and still remain in business. 89 As the quantity of com~unications 
increases, the ratio of quality to babble declines. Intellectual junk 
food proliferates at the expense of nutrition. 
The Coalition believes that the press is capable of elevating 
the interests and tastes of the American people-by elevating its 
own work product. And in the Coalition's view, the press is under a 
moral duty, which should now be enforced through legal mandate, 
to undertake this effort. This, .it should be noted, is a cornerstone 
of the Coalition for a New America's entire agenda: the Coalition 
places great faith and emphasis on the transforming. power of the 
media.40 The Coalition believes that the American press is worthy 
of accepting this challenge for a new America. 41 
87 See id at viii ("The Commission is interested in obtaining a hearing for ideas, not in 
adding to the confusion of tongues."). 
•• See id at 6 ("Civilized society is a working system of ideas. It lives and changes by 
the consumption of ideas."). 
•• See Hutchins Report at 91 (cited in note 2). 
•o As Professor Lee Bollinger argues: 
There is no guarantee that the press will not abuse the freedom it possesses under 
the autonomy model. And there are many ways in which it might do so. The press 
can exclude important points of view, operating as a bottleneck in the market-
place of ideas. It can distort knowledge of public issues not just by omission but 
also through active misrepresentations and lies. It can also exert an adverse influ-
ence over the tone and character of public debate in subtle ways, by playing to 
personal biases and prejudices or by making people fearful and, therefore, desir-
ous of strong authority. It can fuel ignorance and pettiness by avoiding public 
issues altogether, favoring simple-minded fare or cheap entertainment over serious 
discussion. Even if the pressures for low-quality discussion come from the people 
themselves, as to some extent they do, the press acts harmfully by responding to 
those demands and hence satisfying and reinforcing them. It matters not whether 
the press is the instigator of what is bad or the satisfier of inappropriate demands 
originating in the people. In either case, the press can be an appropriate locus for 
reform. 
Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 26-27 (cited in note 3) . 
., The Hutchins Commission itself did have praise for the American press: 
Private enterprise in the field of communications has great achievements to its 
credit. The American press probably reaches as high a percentage of the popula-
tion as that of any other country. Its technical equipment is certainly the best in 
the world. It has taken the lead in the introduction of many new techniques which 
have enormously increased the speed and the variety of communications. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the American press is less venal and less subservient 
to political and economic pressure than that of many other countries. The leading 
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II. SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS 
The principal policy recommendations of the Coalition Task 
Force on Communications Policy, all of which were accepted as 
part of the Coalition Platform, are summarized in the following 
list, annotated where appropriate by summary explanations from 
the Coalition Task Force's report. Many of these recommendations 
would require constitutional amendment. The Coalition Platform 
believes, however, that no democracy will tolerate concentrations 
of power strong enough and irresponsible enough to thwart the as-
pirations of the people, and thus that the American communica-
tions industry, having failed for decades to control itself, must now 
be subject to the force of law!2 Echoing the warning of the Hutch-
ins Commission, the Coalition Platform observes that the First 
Amendment will not and should not save the press from its own 
failings, for if the press remains irresponsible and unresponsive, 
"[t]he amendment will be amended."43 
A. Communications Policies Should Be Comprehensive, Embrac-
ing All Media, and Applicable to All Subject Areas 
A central tenet of the Coalition Platform is that social policy 
must be comprehensive and interconnected. Policy decisions in·one 
area should not work at cross purposes with policy decisions in 
others. In the field of communications, basic philosophical and pol-
icy choices should be consistently applied across various forms of 
media and with regard to all types of subject matter. Thus, if citi-
zens are to have rights of access to the channels of mass communi-
organs of the American press have achieved a standard of excellence unsurpassed 
anywhere in the world. 
Hutchins Report at 52 (cited in note 2). The Coalition is confident that the press can, if 
changes are made, live up to this description. 
•• If there is a defining point of departure between the recommendations of the Coali-
tion Platform and the recommendations of the Hutchins Commission, it is that 'the Com-
mission tended to articulate its recommendations as admonitory goals, often to be pursued 
through informal mechanisms of social control, rather than direct legal regulation. The 
Hutchins Commission thus recommended that educational institutions put more investment 
into funding alternative channels of communication. See Hutchins Report at 97-99 (cited in 
note 2). It recommended academic centers for the advanced study of communications. Id at 
99-100. Further, the Commission recommended that an independent agency be created to 
appraise and report annually on the performance of the press. Id at 100-01. Throughout the 
Hutchins Report, a distinction was drawn between the moral obligations of the press and its 
legal accountability for failing to meet those obligations. See id at 7, 10. The Coalition Plat-
form departs from this split between morality and law, and takes the position that the 
moral obligations of the press should become legally enforceable. 
•• Hutchins Report at 80 (cited in note 2). 
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cation, those rights of access should apply to print, broadcast, 
cable, and other forms of media:'" If restrictions on hate speech are 
enacted, the restrictions should apply to all types of speech written 
in a newspaper or broadcast on a radio program. If society is to 
eliminate misleading or fraudulent "thirty second spots" on televi-
sion, that effort should apply to fraudulent commercial sales 
pitches as well as misleading political campaign advertisements. 
Forms of communication are converging, collapsing the legal 
distinctions that once brought a semblance of order to free speech 
policies.411 New technologies, however, are rendering those divisions 
obsolete. In the past, the FCC promulgated the "equal opportunity 
doctrine" requiring broadcasters to provide equal opportunities for 
political candidates to present their positions;"6 the "fairness doc-
trine," requiring that broadcasters "provide a reasonable opportu-
nity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints";47 "reasonable 
access" rules, requiring stations to provide access to federal politi-
cal candidates;48 and "indecency" regulations, prohibiting broad-
casters from airing "indecent" speech at certain times of the day.49 
These various forms of content regulation have gone in and 
out of favor with the FCC with shifts in reguiatory winds.'10 Never-
•• The Hutchins Commission recommended that the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of the press be extended to "radio and motion pictures." ld at 82. This seems oddly 
quaint and dated to the contemporary ear-quaint because it singles out only radio and film 
as the new technologies that deserve protection; and dated because the notion that the First 
Amendment applies to all media now seems commonplace. The Hutchins Commission did 
not go into much depth, however, concerning the terms on which new media should be 
admitted to the First Amendment family. Based on its remarks concerning radio, however, 
the Hutchins Commission would appear to be in general agreement with the regulatory 
scheme that the Federal Communications Commission ultimately embraced, with the impri-
matur of the Supreme Court. See id at 82-83. 
•• For most of this century, societies could draw lines of demarcation separating print 
media, broadcast media, and common carriers. Historically, radio and television broadcast-
ers, in contrast to print media, have been subject to substantial regulation of the content of 
their speech. See FCC u Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978); Red Lion, 395 US at 367; 
Natl Broadcasting Co. v United States, 319 US 190 (1943). 
•• Kennedy For President Committee v FCC, 636 F2d 417 (DC Cir 1980). 
47 Syracuse Peace Council v FCC, 867 F2d 654, 655 (DC Cir 1989). See also Red Lion, 
395 US at 367. 
•• CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 US 367 (1981). 
•• See Pacifica, 438 US at 741. The definition of "indecent" speech is much broader 
. than the definition of "obscene" speech. Indecent speech includes vulgar or tasteless speech 
that does not qualify as obscene under the relatively strict First Amendment definition of 
obscenity. The FCC rules, therefore, bar broadcasters from disseminating indecent but not 
obscene speech that print publishers could disseminate without restriction. 
•• See, generally, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amend-
ment (University of California Press, 1987); Matthew Spitzer, Seven Dirty Words and Six 
Other Stories: Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast Media (Yale University 
Press, 1986). 
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theless, from a First Amendment perspective, the pattern has been 
relatively consistent. Generally, courts have upheld content-based 
regulation of speech for broadcast media on the theory that the 
special characteristics of that media warrant special First Amend-
ment treatment. 111 The Coalition Platform maintains that these 
forms of regulation are justified by the public policy rationales that 
support . them, rather than the special technical characteristics of 
broadcasting, and thus should be imposed on all media.112 
New communications technologies, indeed, are causing print 
publishers, broadcasters, and common carriers to converge. Cable 
television systems, or computer terminals linked through vast 
database networks, may combine elements of print, broadcasting, 
and common carrier communication, challenging society to deter-
mine the appropriate mix of market regulation and market free-
.dom that ought to apply.113 Because of our belief that policies con-
cerning communications influence all aspects of American political 
and social life, the Coalition's recommendations are intended to af-
fect a broad range of media and messages.114 
"' As discussed later, courts have been less clear in separating· those aspects of broad-
cast media that make it technically different from other media from those aspects that 
make it different in its social function in the culture. See note 52 and accompanying text. 
•• When it first approved federal regulation of broadcasting, the Supreme Court used 
the problem of spectrum scarcity as the sole justification for governmental intervention. See 
Natl Broadcasting Co., 319 US at 226. In its landmark decision in Red Lion, 395 US at 367, 
the Court upheld the fairness doctrine, again relying on spectrum scarcity: 
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there 
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment 
right to broadcast comparabJe to the right of every individual to speak, write, or 
publish. . . . A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional 
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the 
exclusion of his fellow citizens. 
ld at 388-89. As argued in the text, the Coalition Platform takes the position that decisions 
to regulate the content of speech should be emancipated from the technical characteristics 
of the media in which the speech takes place, and instead based upon the social policies that 
make regulation of the speech desirable. See note 54 and accompanying text. 
•• See, ge11erally, William H. Dutton, Jay G. Blumler, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, eds, 
Wired Cities: Shaping the Future of Communications (G.K. Hall & Co., 1987); William W. 
Van Alstyne, Interpretations of the First Amendment ch 3 (Duke University Press, 1984). 
•• In this respect the Coalition Task Force notes that its efforts are more ambitious 
than those of the Hutchins Commission. The Commission's report opened by drawing a 
distinction between the influence of the press on the state of public discourse about "public 
affairs," and the influence of the press on American culture. The Commission limited its 
focus to commentary upon the "role of the agencies of mass communication in the education 
of the people in public affairs." Hutchins Report at vi (cited in note 2). The Coalition Task 
Force does not limit itself in such a manner. 
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B. Legally Enforceable Codes of Journalistic Ethics Should Be 
Created 
The Coalition Platform makes a general claim that American 
society must rededicate itself to maintaining ethical standards in 
business, medicine, law, government, education, science, and the 
many other callings that constitute society. 1111 Journalists should 
not be exempt from this effort, and consistent with the recommen-
dations contained in other sections of the Coalition Platform, the 
Coalition calls for the creation of a National Code of Ethics for 
Journalists that shall, like the ethical codes for law and medicine, 
have the force and effect of law. Specifically, a license shall be re-
quired to practice journalism, and the license shall be suspended or 
revoked for serious violations of the Ethics Code. 
As the Hutchins Commission observed, "[a] profession is a 
group- organized to perform a public service."116 In a profession, 
there usually exists a confidential relationship between the recipi-
ent of the· service and the person rendering the service. There is 
also an "esprit de corps resting, among other things, on a common 
training and centering in the maintenance of standards. "117 In the-
ory, members. of a profession will perform their services according 
to certain standards of quality and ethical behavior even though 
they could make more money by behaving in other ways.118 
C. Affirmative Obligations on the Media to Provide Public Fora 
for Debate and Discussion 
All media outlets and organizations should have affirmative le-
gal obligations to act as "common carriers" for public debate and 
discussion.119 This obligation should exist for all mass media, re-
gardless of the technical format. Thus, the duty should be imposed 
•• For lawyers and doctors, the ethical standards of the profession are committed to 
ethical codes that have nearly the force of law. Currently, nothing similar exists for journal-
ists, though the public service they perform is as important as any. Id at 77. The Hutchins 
Commission believed that the ideals and attitudes that cultivate professionalism in law, 
medicine, or divinity are nurtured by law schools, medical schools, and divinity schools. 
Journalism schools, however, had not taken up the task of imbuing students with any sense 
of professionalism. Instead, journalism schools taught mostly "tricks and machinery of the 
trade," and missed entirely their central mission: teaching the journalist to be a "competent 
judge of public affairs." Id at 78. 
•• ld at 76 . 
., Hutchins Report at 76 (cited in note 2). 
•• Id at 76-77. 
•• The Hutchins Commission argued forcefully that the great agencies of mass commu-
nication should accept the role of common carriers of discussion. See id at 92. 
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on print media (such as newspapers and magazines), broadcast me-
dia (such as television and radio broadcast licensees and networks), 
wire transmissions (such as cable television operators and net-
works), and computer communications (such as computer bulletin 
boards or databases). The precise nature of this common carrier 
obligation will vary depending on the medium's technical capabili-
ties and sociological function, but the general obligation should ex-
ist for all media. Press representatives generally accepted that this 
public forum function was an appropriate role for the press, at 
least as a matter of moral aspiration. Press representatives did not 
agree, however, that this function should become a legal obligation. 
Further, many press representatives maintained that the press to-
day deserves high marks for its performance in facilitating public 
discussion. 60 
D. Reform of Laws Protecting Privacy and Reputation 
The Coalition proposes legislation substantially limiting the 
flow. of information in the private sector and governmental com-
puter databases that invades individual privacy.61 The Coalition 
also proposes reforming tort laws relating to libel and invasion of 
privacy. These reforms would provide more meaningful remedies 
to persons who have been defamed or who have had their privacy 
invaded by emphasizing retractions and right of reply remedies in 
lieu of money damages. The Coalition thus urges repudiating the 
doctrine of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo,62 in which the 
Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute that granted a 
political candidate a right to equal space to reply to a newspaper's 
criticism and attacks on his record.63 
80 Several witnesses presented testimony arguing that almost all major media do devote 
a significant amount of space or time to the "forum function." In the words of one witness: 
The question is not whether the press has been reasonably generous in its com-
mon carrier obligations, but whether what is carried has been "elevated dis-
course." The Coalition cannot have it both ways. It cannot "democratize" the air-
waves without putting up with the views of callers who actually use them. And 
those, it turns out, vary dramatically, depending on the program. 
"' See David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal 
Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States (University of 
North Carolina Press, 1989). 
•• 418 US at 241. 
18 The Hutchins Commission recommended that legislators enact an alternative to the 
present remedy for libel whereby the injured party might obtain a retraction or right of 
reply. Hutchins Report at 86 (cited in note 2). There was a degree of prescience to this 
recommendation, at least in terms of predicting the focal point of public debate. Particu-
larly in the last five years, debate over libel reform has been prominent in the communica-
tions industry. · 
166 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1993: 
As a philosophical matter, the Coalition accepts the validity of 
the distinction the Hutchins Commission draws between a "lie" 
and an "error."84 Error we will always have with us. The market-
place contemplates error; indeed the advance of science or politics 
would not be possible without it. But to lie deliberately is both to 
·add an evil to the world that would not otherwise exist, and to use 
the right to free expression in a manner that cannot be squared 
with the moral underpinnings of the right. 811 
The Coalition believes that it should be presumptively illegal 
(and grounds for a tort suit for invasion of privacy) for the press to 
reveal, without an individual's consent, matters related to an 
individual's: 
(1) mental and emotional condition, including grief; 
(2) physical health; 
(3) love and sexual relationships, including sexual orientation; 
(4) decisions concerning procreation, including a decision to 
have an abortion; 
(5) family relationships; 
(6) victimization, including whether the individual has been a 
victim of violent or sexual assault; 
(7) intense and close-knit associations, memberships, and 
affiliations; 
(8) deep personal beliefs, such as religious convictions; and 
(9) personal financial matters. 
The Coalition does not maintain that determining whether an 
individual's privacy has been invaded is an exact science, but this 
is precisely the type of decision well-suited to case-by-case adjudi-
cation in the courts. The Coalition merely maintains that certain 
.. ld at 10. 
•• Id. In an intriguing caveat, the Hutchins Commission was unwilling to calibrate legal 
responsibility to the contours of the moral right. Although possibly forfeiting one's moral 
entitlement to speak one's mind when engaging, for example, in a deliberate lie, the Hutch-
ins Commission did not believe that legal responsibility could be tied to this intent. "Legal 
protection," the Hutchins Commission claimed, "cannot vary with the fluctuations of inner 
moral direction in individual wills; it does not cease whenever a person has abandoned the 
moral ground of his right." Id. 
In crafting First Amendment protection for libelous speech, however, the Supreme 
Court has in a sense permitted legal protection to vary with inner moral direction. New 
York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US at 254, and its progeny use a subjective standard of fault 
geared to the speaker's state of mind. In Herbert v Lando, 781 F2d 298 (2d Cir 1986), for 
instance, the Court expressly endorsed the notion that inquiry into the "publisher's state of 
mind" was a permissible part of libel litigation conducted under the New York Times stan-
dard. Id at 309. For the reasons articulated in the text, the Coalition believes that current 
libel law as it has evolved since New York Times Co. v Sullivan should be abandoned in 
favor of a regime that places greater emphasis on remedies sue}). as retraction and reply. 
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matters should be regarded as acutely private. Existing laws, in-
cluding existing First Amendment principles, should be altered to 
make the press accountable for revealing such matters when there 
is no genuine journalistic justification for the revelation. 
The Coalition Platform's emphasis on increasing protection 
from the invasion of individual privacy is not grounded solely in 
the Coalition's solicitude for the victims of such invasion.88 In-
stead, the Coalition believes that these invasions also injure public 
discourse generally by making the spread of gossip a primary func-
tion of the mass media and crowding out information of greater 
importance. The Coalition thus seconds the Hutchins Commis-
sion's observation that the communications industry "has trans-
ferred to mass communication what had formerly passed from per-
son to person as gossip, rumor, and oral discussion."87 The 
Commission's disquiet over the tendency of the press to emphasize 
scoops, ~ensations, and scandals would certainly find no soothing 
balm in the headlines of our times. The Coalition Platform thus 
endorses more rigorous privacy laws to deter sensationalist and 
prurient reporting, not because these matters will fail to "sell" in 
the marketplace, but because reporting on them tends to crowd 
out discussion of more significant events and issues. 
The Coalition believes that one of the most pernicious tenden-
cies in modern American journalism is the "tabloiding" of the 
American press. One of the most popular motifs in prime-time tel-
evision programming today is the scandal television format, in 
which television shows emulate supermarket tabloids in presenting 
sensationalistic exposes. Current First Amendment jurisprudence 
actually operates perversely in this regard by rewarding tabloid 
journalism and penalizing respectable journalists who conscien-
tiously seek to verify the accuracy of information. 
A prime example of this tendency is Masson v New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc.,68 which involved a psychoanalyst who, through his 
professional activities, came to know Dr. Kurt Eissler, head of the 
Sigmund Freud Archives, and Dr. Anna Freud, a psychoanalyst 
and daughter of Sigmund Freud. In 1980, Eissler and Anna Freud 
•• See, for example, Paul Marcus and Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape 
Victims' Identities, 64 S Cal L Rev 1019 (1991). 
•• Hutchins Report at 53 (cited in note 2). The Hutchins Commission noted that this 
phenomenon is ·not new-indeed it may be part of what defines mass culture. Thus, the 
oldest "mass medium," the Acta diurna, was an official bulletin board publishing the news 
in Rome of th.e first Caesars, including reports of crime, sports, and other sensational events, 
as well as official propaganda and news on public affairs. Id. 
•• 960 F2d 896 (9th Cir 1992), decision on remand from 111 S Ct at 2419. 
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hired Masson as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud 
Archives.69 Masson was fired from his job after becoming disillu-
sioned with and lecturing against Freudian psychology. 70 
Writer Janet Malcolm, a frequent contributor to New Yorker 
magazine, agreed with Masson to write an article about his tenure 
with the Archives, based on a series of telephone and in-person 
interviews with him.71 During the editorial process, Masson ex-
pressed alarm at what he claimed was misinformation contained in 
several passages. Masson asked to review those portions of the arti-
cle which attributed quotations or information to him, but the de-
fendants never responded to his request.72 In December 1983, the 
New Yorker published the article as a two-part series, and in 1984, 
with knowledge of Masson's allegation that the article was defama-
tory, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., published the entire article as a book, 
In the Freud Archives. Masson complained in a letter to the New 
York Times Book Review that the book was "distorted," and later 
sued for libel. 73 
During the tortuous course of the litigation, Judge Alex Kozin-
ski, writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, observed that 
publishers like the New Yorker, whose practice it is to investigate 
rigorously the accuracy of their stories, are at a disadvantage com-
pared to other newspapers or supermarket tabloids in the applica-
tion of the actual malice standard: 
We are aware that this puts publishers like the New 
Yorker-whose practice it is to investigate the accuracy 
of its stories-at something of a disadvantage compared 
to other publishers such as newspapers and supermarket 
tabloids that cannot or will not engage in thorough fact-
checking. After all, publications that check their stories 
for accuracy are more likely to develop "obvious reasons 
to doubt" than ones that do not. . . . Readers of reputa-
ble magazines such as the New Yorker are f!lr more likely 
to trust the verbatim accuracy of the stories they read 
than are the readers of supermarket tabloids or even 
daily newspapers, where they understand the inherent 
limitations in the fact-finding process. The harm inflicted 
by a misstatement in a publication known for scrupu-
•• Masson, 111 S Ct at 2424. 
7o Id. 
71 ld. 
71 Masson, 111 S Ct at 2424-25. 
78 Id at 2425. 
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lously investigating the accuracy of its stories can be far 
more serious than a similar misstatement in a publication 
known not to do so. This is not to say, of course, that 
statements in publications less rigorous than the New 
Yorker cannot be defamatory, or that such publishers 
will escape liability when they turn a blind eye to known 
or strongly suspected inaccuracies. 74 
169 
The Coalition believes that the actions of the New Yorker and 
writer Janet Malcolm in the Masson case, if as alleged by Dr. Mas-
son, should be condemned and deserve punishment under the libel 
laws. Nonetheless, the Coalition finds the jurisprudence applied by 
the courts in Masson utterly incomprehensible, because it results 
in greater legal protection for tabloids than for conscientious news 
organizations. The law should work in exactly the opposite way, 
encouraging careful and thoughtful journalism, and penaliz-
ing-even to the point of driving out of business-the shoddy sen-
sationalism of the tabloids. 7 il 
E. Greater Protection of Privacy through Limitations on 
Commercial Trafficking in Private Information and Alteration 
of the Definition of "Public Records" 
Individuals should be protected from invasion of privacy by 
commercial, governmental, and news organizations using computer 
74 Masson, 960 F2d at 901-02 n 5. 
•• The Coalition finds the statements of the court in Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v Globe 
Inti, Inc., 786 F Supp 791 (W DArk), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 978 F2d 1065 (8th Cir 
1992), extremely useful in this regard. The plaintiff in Globe was conservator of the estate of 
Nellie Mitchell, allegedly defamed by an article in the Sun tabloid newspaper. The plaintiff 
also made invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Ms. 
Mitchell had operated a newsstand on the town square of Mountain Home, Arkansas since 
1963. Her suit arose from a story entitled, "World's oldest newspaper carrier, 101, quits 
because she's pregnant!" The story concerned a woman in Australia, and a fictitious name, 
but the picture used was of Ms. Mitchell. The jury found in favor of the newspaper on the 
defamation claim, but also found that the newspaper's conduct invaded Ms. Mitchell's pri-
vacy by placing her in a false light and that it constituted an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The jury awarded $650,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000 in puni-
tive damages, and the district court upheld these awards. See 786 F Supp at 793. The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for a substantial remitter of compensatory damages. 
978 F2d at 1071. 
The district court held that "[t]he invasion of privacy claim stands upon a different 
footing than the defamation claim." 786 F Supp at 797, quoting Dodrill v Arkansas Demo-
crat Co., 265 Ark 628, 637, 590 SW2d 840 (1979). False light, the court argued, requires only 
a showing that the depiction would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that the 
defendant had knowledge of falsity or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of publica-
tion. ld, citing Dodrill, 265 Ark at 638. 
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technologies to assemble and traffic in private information. The 
concept of "public records" should be altered so as to prevent cer-
tain data gathered by governmental entities from entering the pub-
lic domain. The identity of victims of certain crimes, such as rape 
or sexual harassment, for example, should not be treated as "pub-
lic records~' when official charges are brought by such victims, and 
laws should be enacted preventing anyone from publishing the 
names of such persons without their consent.76 
The information gathering and storage capacities of modern 
government, and of modern news organizations, heighten concerns 
regarding the protection of individual privacy, autonomy, and dig-
nity. Computer databases, for example, may immensely enlarge the 
capacity of government agencies or major news organizations to 
form composite pictures of the transactions and events in an indi-
vidual's life, creating vast memories that never fade. 
The Supreme Court recently addressed this problem in the 
context of computerized records of "rap sheets" containing the 
composite criminal records of individuals gathered from court-
house and police records scattered throughout the country. Al-
though many of the individual bits of information, such as the dis-
positions of the cases, were already public records, the Court held 
that an individual could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the composite picture formed by the aggregation of this informa-
tion in the central computer database of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 77 
F. Restrictions on Hate Speech, Pornographic Speech, and Public 
Vulgarity 
Just as the Coalition Platform calls for a revolutionary redi-
rection of public resources to clean up the physical environment, 
the Coalition Platform also calls for a major effort to "clean the 
environment of public discourse." Laws should be passed creating 
criminal penalties and rights of private recovery of civil damages 
•• There is some ambiguity as to whether implementation of this recommendation 
would require modification of the Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 US 
524 (1989), which held that a state could not punish a newspaper's publication of a rape 
victim's name where the victim's name was already a matter of the public record. Neverthe-
less, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a well-crafted statute could pass consti-
tutional muster under existing First Amendment doctrines. See Marcus & McMahon, 64 S 
Cal L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 66). 
11 See United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, 489 US 749 (1989). 
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for various forms ·of offensive speech, including "hate speech," 
"pornographic speech," and "public vulgarity." 
It is particularly important that the press do better in at-
tempting to generate tolerance and understanding among the 
many constituent groups that exist within American society. In 
1947, the Hutchins Commission perceived an America in which 
images of many ethnic groups were distorted. The Hutchins Com-
mission thus expressed the humanistic aspiration that the press 
work to improve understanding of different social groups.78 
The Hutchins Commission's identification of the problem was 
undoubtedly accurate in 1947 and probably remains accurate in 
1996. In 1947, racial and ethnic groups were often portrayed as de-
grading stereotypes. The open and widespread prejudice that char-
acterized American culture then, and that was visible in the mass 
media, has certainly diminished dramatically in modern American 
life. It would be extremely difficult, for example, to make a con-
vincing case that the principle news organizations upon which 
most Americans rely for information today are deeply infected 
with racism. 
But the truth remains that communication about the many 
discrete communities that comprise contemporary America is not 
what it should be and that as a society we are a long way from 
establishing a cohesive national community. The violence in Los 
Angeles following the Rodney King verdict underscored the depth 
of racial and ethnic division, distrust,. and despair in modern 
American life. We are a multi-ethnic society that is still far from 
coming to grips with our multi-ethnicity. 
The Coalition understands that prejudice and passion are in-
evitably part of communication and that irrational elements are 
always part of public discourse. The press will always be 
prejudiced, for prejudice is endemic to the human condition. And 
thus like all speakers, the press will always be at once an agent 
with potential for both good and evil.'9 The Coalition is convinced, 
however, that the force of law must now be brought to bear upon 
society's. passions and prejudices. Just as the Coalition Platform 
•• See Hutchins Report at 26-27 (cited in note 2). 
70 See id at 7 ("As freedom of the press is always in danger, so it is always dangerous."). 
The Coalition notes that the Hutchins Commission did not see this potential danger as a 
justification for regulation; rather, it viewed this danger as part of what supplied spontane-
ity and life to the marketplace. ld ("[l]f we are to live progressively we must live danger-
ously."). For the reasons articulated generally in the Coalition Platform, our view is that the 
time has run out for the press to reform itself-just as the time has run out for many other 
American public and private institutions. 
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calls for a massive rededication to principles of equality and 
human dignity in American life,80 the Coalition Platform calls for· 
laws that make the press and other speakers accountable for inju-
ries caused by irrational appeals to passion and prejudice. 
The Hutchins Commission, it should be noted, wrote at a time 
when First Amendment jurisprudence had just begun to develop. 
The Hutchins Commission thus embraced the "categorical" ap-
proach to First Amendment doctrine characteristic of Chaplinsky 
v New Hampshire. 81 The Hutchins Commission wrote that "[t]he 
already recognized areas of legal correction of misused liberty of 
expression-libel, misbranding, obscenity, incitement to riot, sedi-
tion, in case of clear and present danger-have a common princi-
ple; namely, that an utterance or publication invades in a serious, 
overt, and demonstrable manner personal rights or vital social in-
terests."82 More important, the Hutchins Commission contem-
plated that the list of categories of permissible regulation could ex-
pand, though the burden of justifying further expansion would be 
"on those who would extend these categories."83 
The Coalition Platform strongly supports the view that cate-
gories of permissible regulation of speech should indeed expand in 
multiple ways. The time has come to expand the categories of 
speech subject to regulation, the definition of those categories, and 
the types of regulation permissible for speech falling within them. 
The Coalition Platform thus urges the rejection of the Supreme 
Court's ruling in R.A. V. v City of St. Paul. 8" The Court's majority 
opinion in R.A. V., written by Justice Scalia, employed a sweeping 
80 See, for example, the Coalition Platform's recommendations for increasing penalties 
for violations of civil rights laws and bias-motivated crimes. 
81 315 US 568 (1942). There was a time when the Supreme Court appeared to embrace 
a relatively mechanical approach to free speech doctrine, treating certain categories of 
speech as utterly outside the protection of the Constitution. The most famous exposition of 
this approach came in Chaplinsky, in which the Court listed "the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words' " as among those classes of speech 
"the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu· 
tional problem." Id at 571-72. 
82 Hutchins Report at 11 (cited in note 2). 
88 Id . 
.. 112 S Ct 2538 (1992). In R.A. V., the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul, Minne-
sota, "hate speech" ordinance that provided: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, char-
acterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swas-
tika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits 
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn Legis Code § 292.02 (1990). A 
minor was charged under the ordinance for burning a cross inside a black family's yard. See, 
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rationale that would, if left unmodified, result in invalidating vir-
tually all hate speech laws. The Court's opinion opened with a 
broad condemnation of content-based regulation of speech, a con-
demnation that went out of its way to repudiate the mechanical 
"categorical approach" associated with Chaplinsky v New Hamp-
shire.8"' At the heart of the Court's opinion in R.A. V. was the pro-
position that the First Amendment's restrictions on content-based 
and viewpoint-based discrimination apply even when the govern-
ment regulation involves a type of speech that as a class normally 
receives no First Amendment protection. The Court applied a ra-
tional derivative of the First Amendment's virtually absolute ban 
on viewpoint-based discrimination. Although it is constitutionally 
permissible, for example, to criminalize the distribution of "ob-
scene" speech, it is not permissible to single out some subset of 
obscene speech-such as obscene speech critical of the govern-
ment-for specially disfavorable treatment.86 Similarly, while 
speech that meets the current constitutional definition of "fighting 
words" may be punished, it is not permissible to take one subclass 
of fighting words-such as racist fighting words-and to treat that 
generally, Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns Law Barring Hate Crimes, Wash Post 
Al (June 23, 1992). 
The defendant did not challenge the right of the city to prosecute him for his acts, but 
argued that the ordinance was overbroad, because it potentially censored constitutionally 
protected speech. 112 S Ct at 2541. 
86 Thus the Court in R.A. V. explained: 
We have sometimes said that [certain] categories of expression are "not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection of the First 
Amendment does not extend" to them. Such statements must be taken in context, 
however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated short-
hand characterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all." What they mean is 
that these areas of .speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regu-
lated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defama-
tion, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Consti-
tution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated 
to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the government may proscribe 
libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only 
libel critical of the government. 
112 S Ct at 2542-43 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
88 As the R.A. V. Court stated: 
Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment im-
poses no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such pros-
cribable expression, so that the government "may regulate· [them] freely." That 
would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance prohibiting only those 
legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed, 
that do not include endorsement of the city government. Such a simplistic, ali-or-
nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at odds with common 
sense and with our jurisprudence as well. 
Id at 2543 (citations omitted). 
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class more severely because of social disagreement with the racist 
message expressed. 87 In a passage that severely limited the reach of 
Chaplinsky, the Court argued: 
[I]t is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de 
minimis" expressive content, or that their content is in 
all respects "worthless and undeserving of constitutional 
protection"; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed. 
We have not said that they constitute "no part of the 
expression of ideas," but only that they constitute "no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas."88 
In a nutshell, it is the considered view of the Coalition Plat-
form that the Supreme Court's ruling in R.A. V. could not have 
been more wrong-headed and that the Court's ruling in Chaplin-
sky was absolutely correct, in both letter and spirit. The Coalition 
Platform thus calls for a new First Amendment that will reject the 
jurisprudence of R.A. V. and reinstate the categorical limitations 
promulgated in Chaplinsky. 
G. Heavy Public Investment m Funding for the Arts and 
Humanities 
A significant new investment should be made in the funding of 
public programs designed to enrich public discourse and culture, 
such as funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as their local 
counterparts. The receipt of such funding by private artists or au-
thors, however, should be made conditional on their compliance 
with all applicable laws governing communications policy. 
The Hutchins Commission urged the government to use gov-
ernment-funded mass media to supplement the marketplace.89 
Among the most profound structural changes in electronic commu-
nication since the Hutchins Commission's report is the emergence 
and flowering of public broadcasting. 90 Institutions. such as PBS on 
81 See id at 2545. 
•• Id at 2543-44 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
•• Hutehins Report at 89 (cited in note 2). 
•• The Hutchins Commission did at times mention, usually in passing, the potential for 
government broadcasting. In a footnote early in the Report, for example, it stated: "A third 
possibility is that government itself may come into the field with an alternative system of 
communications. The Commission has given little consideration to this possibility, except in 
international communications. Yet the example of Station WNYC, controlled by New York 
City, suggests what government may do in domestic communications if it regards private 
service as inadequate." Id at 5-6 n 1. 
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television and NPR on radio have changed the communications 
landscape; if broadcasting was once a vast wasteland, it is no more. 
H. Increasi11g Rights of Press Access to Public Institutions and 
Events 
The press should have greater rights of access to public insti-
tutions and events, including the operations of government. Except 
for limitations that may be justified as narrowly tailored to vindi-
cate compelling governmental interests-such as the protection- of 
privacy, or national security secrets-the press should have a right 
of access to governmental operations that is commensurate with 
the capabilities of modern communications technologies. This right 
of access should specifically include the right to enter public build-
ings and meetings with television and radio equipment and to 
broadcast such proceedings, including court proceedings. The right 
should also include access to most military operations. 
While the Coalition is aware that many elements in the press 
have criticized its recommendations, the Coalition believes that its 
proposals calling for greater rights of access for the press should be 
attractive to journalists, marking an expansion of rights journalists 
currently enjoy.91 Indeed, the Coalition's proposals for greater 
rights of access were among the few proposals that gained active 
support among representatives of the press who testified before the 
Coalition. While the Supreme Court has not been willing to recog-
nize a general right of access to government information, it has 
been quite steadfast in maintaining the ~xistence of a specific right 
of access to court proceedings and records. An important series of 
cases has reinforced this access to trial proceedings, not as a right 
of press access alone, but as a right of general public access in 
which the press fully shares.92 In one of those cases, Richmond 
91 In Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817 (1974), and Saxbe v Washington Post Co., 417 US 
843 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld regulations of the California Department of Correc-
tions and the Federal Bureau of Prisons barring journalists from interviewing specifically 
designated prison inmates. In Houchins v KQED, Inc., 438 US 1 (1978), the Court was faced 
with a case in which television station KQED sought permission to inspect and take photo-
graphs at the Alameda, California, County Jail, where a prisoner had reportedly committed 
suicide. The conditions in the jail were allegedly decrepit, and these conditions allegedly led 
to the prisoner's suicide. Id at 3. The Sheriff of Alameda County, in response to the contro-
versy, announced a program of monthly tours open to the public. Id at 4. Reporters could 
participate in the tours, but could not take cameras or tape recorders, or interview inmates. 
Id at 4-5. The Supreme Court, in a highly splintered vote, upheld the regulations. 
•• See, for example, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980); Press-
Enterprise Co. v Superior Court, 478 US 1 (1986). 
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Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia,93 the Court held that both press and 
public enjoy some constitutionally guaranteed right of attendance 
to places such as criminal trials, which are historically open to the 
public: 
It is not crucial whether we describe this· right to attend 
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observa-
tions concerning them as a "right of access," or a "right 
to gather information," for we have recognized that 
"without some protection for seeking out the news, free-
dom of the press could be eviscerated." The explicit, 
guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning 
what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if 
access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be fore-
closed arbitrarily.94 
Many representatives of the press testified that they would in-
deed like to see First Amendment jurisprudence evolve to embrace 
far broader rights of access, and they welcomed this aspect of the 
Coalition Platform.911 
I. Access Rights of Individual Citizens to the Mass Media 
Individual citizens should have legal rights of access to the 
mass media without regard to the technical format of such media. 
This right of access should be legally enforceable and should in-
clude. a right to participate in the "public fora" that such media 
shall be required by law to maintain, as well as rights to obtain 
retractions or opportunities to reply when attacked in mass media. 
In colonial times, "anybody with anything to say" had com-
paratively little difficulty getting it published.96 Government cen-
sorship was the only real threat to free expression because free ex-
pression was decentralized. Today, however, the polity is too large 
and complex; a person's idea has no chance of making it into the 
marketplace unless the owners and managers of the mass media 
give the idea access. Censorship by the government is no longer the 
only, if indeed even the primary, threat to the mar~etplace. 
Rather, censorship by private actors-principally by those who 
•• 448 US at 555 . 
.. Id at 576-77 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
•• Press representatives were particularly alarmed by the tendencies to grant or deny 
access on a discriminatory or selective basis. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press 
Access and the First Amendment, 10 Communications Lawyer No 21, 16·19 (Summer 
1992). 
88 Hutchins Report at 14 (cited in note 2). 
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own and operate the means of mass communication, has sup-
planted it. The moral right of those who own the press to speak 
their own minds must remain intact; but it must be supplemented 
by a moral obligation to grant access to the ideas of others. 
J. Antitrust Laws Should Be Revised to Discourage Concentra-
tion of Ownership of Mass Media 
The antitrust laws should be revised to establish per se rules 
that severely limit concentration of private ownership of mass me-
dia. The Coalition Platform thus embraces the recommendations 
of the Hutchins Commission that the antitrust laws be used to fos-
ter competition, and where concentration is necessary in the com-
munications industry, that the government engage in regulation to 
ensure that the public gain the benefits of concentration.97 At vari-
ous times in its history, the Federal Communications Commission 
has adopted rules limiting the number of broadcast stations that a 
person may own nationwide98 or in a single community99 and 
prohibiting newspaper publishers from owning television stations 
in the same communities in which they publish.100 The Coalition is 
convinced that these regulations should be resurrected, reinforced, 
and revitalized. 
Some witnesses testified that circumstances have changed 
since 1947, and that today efforts to increase diversity in the mar-
ketplace are unnecessary. These witnesses testified that the com-
munications marketplace today is in robust shape, as evidenced by 
the many channels on cable, electronic town meetings, public 
broadcasting, community access television, computers, databases, 
computerized bulletin boards, and desktop publishing.101 
There were also witnesses who testified that new technologies 
will make it possible for individuals to engage in interactive com-
munications in situations that were once merely passive. Individu-
•• ld at 83-86. 
•• United States u Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192 (1956) (upholding the FCC 
regulation that no person or group could control more than seven AM, seven FM, and five 
TV stations, now changed to 30-30-12). See 47 CFR § 73.3555(e)(l). 
•• In re Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306 (1970) (prohibiting the 
granting of any application for a broadcast license if after the grant the licensee would own, 
operate, or control two or more full-time broadcast stations within the same market). 
10° FCC u National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 US 775 (1978). 
101 Former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, while on the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, made much this same point in endorsing the idea that regulation of broadcasting is 
not justified in a world in which there is no numerical scarcity of diverse viewpoints in the 
marketplace. See Syracuse Peace Council u FCC, 867 F2d 654, 682-84 (DC Cir 1989) (Starr 
concurring). 
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als will talk back to their television sets and their local newspa-
pers, and indeed will themselves become broadcasters, publishers, 
and database operators as computer terminals, electronic bulletin 
boards, new video formats, and technologies yet undreamed of tie 
us together in entirely new speech relationships. Large institutions 
will no longer talk down from single points at the tops of pyramids 
to the masses of individuals at the base. Traditional communica-
tions pyramids will instead gradually give way to more egalitarian 
models in which multiple speakers interact with multiple listeners, 
blurring distinctions between publishers ·and receivers of 
information. 
The Hutchins Commission perceived concentration of mass 
media ownership as one of the most pernicious trends of the 
time.102 Concentration has in many ways accelerated. Yet the pic-
ture is mixed, and it is difficult to know exactly what to make of it. 
Many old communications empires have grown, but many new 
communications empires have also emerged. The national market-
place contains a rich mixture of diverse editorial voices. 
At the local level, however, the portrait is often different. Most 
towns are one-newspaper towns. The broadcast outlets within a 
community are usually owned by large national networks and thus 
do not have very distinct editorial personalities. At the local level 
it thus becomes specially vital that public access channels be avail-
able and that print and broadcast media take to heart their func-
tion as common carriers of discussion. 
The Coalition is encouraged by the possibility that new tech-
nologies will enrich the marketplace of ideas and believes that gov-
ernment regulatory policies should be implemented to further their 
development. Despite some positive signs concerning the diversity 
of the American marketplace of ideas, it nevertheless remains true 
that mass media forms the "umbrella" marketplace that links all 
of these sub-markets together. Unless the quality of that general 
marketplace is improved, the hopes for a national community mov-
ing forward to take control of events and meet the serious eco-
nomic, environmental, and social problems that beset the nation, 
will be dashed. 
•o• See Hutchins Report at 36-51 (cited in note 2). 
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K. Commercial Advertising Should Be Regulated to Eliminate 
Image and Lifestyle Advertising and Require Emphasis on 
Useful Information 
Modern mass advertising has lost all connection to what ought 
to be its principle function: providing accurate factual information 
to consumers to help them make rational choices in the market-
place. The logic and tenor of public discourse changes as modern 
advertising becomes less concerned with conveying information 
about products and more concerned with conveying image and fan-
tasy. This debases the normative values once associated with our 
cultural images and symbols ana actually alters the identity of the 
consumer, who comes to believe that products are invested with 
miraculous powers. Powerful advertisers can reshape the media in 
their own image encouraging a discourse in the service of waste 
and turning what was once a citizen-democracy into a consumer-
democracy.103 Political leaders in turn mimic the strategies of ad-
vertisers, further blurring the line between political and commer- . 
cial discourse. 10" 
The Coalition Platform urges aggressive new regulation of 
commercial advertising to force advertisers to return to formats 
that emphasize factual consumer information. Implementation of 
this proposal would require a significant reduction of constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech.1011 The Coalition is not an-
108 The influence of advertisers on the editorial independence of radio broadcasters was 
a significant concern of the Hutchins Commission. See id at 95-96. 
104 See Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 
Tex L Rev 697 (1992). 
100 See, for example, Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association, 486 US 466 (1988) (state. 
may not categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business by sending truthful and 
non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face a particular legal problem); Bolger v 
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 US 60 (1983) (federal statute prohibiting the mailing of 
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives is an unconstitutional restriction of commer-
cial speech); Central Hudson. Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission of New 
York, 447 US 557 (1980) (striking down regulation completely banning electric utility from 
advertising to promote use of electricity); Village of Schaumburg v Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 US 620 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicita-
tion of contributions by charitable organizations not using at least 75 percent of receipts for 
charitable purposes was unconstitutionally overbroad); First Natl Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 
435 US 765 (1978) (First Amendment protection extended to corporation in its attempt to 
influence voting on individual income tax referenda without a showing of a material effect 
on their business or property); Carey v Population Services lntl, 431 US 678 (1977) (prohi-
bition of advertising or display of contraceptives not justified on grounds that ads would be 
offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them and permitting such ads would legiti-
mize sexual activity of young people); Linmark Associates, Inc. v Willingboro, 431 US 85 
(1977) (ordinance prohibiting posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on residential property 
not justified by township's perception of flight of white homeowners from racially integrated 
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tagonistic to aggressive advertising, and certainly the existence of a 
profit motive should not, by itself, disqualify speech from signifi-
cant legal protection.106 Because the Coalition believes, however, 
that mass advertising as it exists in the world today bears little 
plausible connection either to the processes of self-government/07 
or to rational consumer decisionmaking, 108 the Coalition supports 
substantially greater regulation of commercial speech. 
L. Mass Media and Election Laws 
The use of paid political advertisements in electronic mass 
media should be prohibited. This will end the "thirty-second spot" 
political advertising common today, in which candidates are essen-
tially "sold" to the public like commercial commodities, using im-
agery and slogans that are often misleading or meaningless and 
that often cause political discourse to deteriorate to destructive 
mud-slinging. Instead, large blocks of broadcast and cable air time 
should be provided free of charge to candidates for political office 
to present their substantive views on issues. Broadcast licensees 
and cable operators should be required, as a condition for licen-
sure, to dedicate substantial portions of their time to providing 
such candidate access during election years. In the weeks prior to 
community); Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 US 748 (1976) (ban on advertising prescription drug prices not justified by state's inter-
est in maintaining professionalism of licensed pharmacists); Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809 
(1975) (paid commercial advertisement in newspaper protected by First Amendment; con-
viction of newspaper editor for encouraging or prompting an abortion through the sale of a 
publication overturned). 
106 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 761 ("[S]peech does not lose its First Amend-
ment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form 
or another .... Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 
"sold" for profit."), citing Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 35-39 (1976); New York Times Co. v 
Sullivan, 376 US at 266; Pittsburgh Press Co. v Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions, 413 US 376, 384 (1973); Smith v California, 361 US 147, 150 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v Wilson, 343 US 495, 501 (1952); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 111 (1943). 
See also Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 64 (Michie Co., 
1984). 
107 See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic 
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VaL Rev 1, 5-6 (1979) ("The first amendment 
guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifiable values. Chief 
among them is effective self-government. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the 
opportunity for individual self-fulfillment through free expression. Neither value is impli-
cated by governmental regulation of commercial speech."); Lillian R. BeVier, The First 
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 
30 Stan L Rev 299, 352-55 (1978) (arguing against protection for commercial speech because 
it bears no relation to processes of politics and public decisionmaking). 
108 See Collins & Skover, 71 Tex L Rev at 697 (cited in note 104). 
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elections, certain evenings should be dedicated exclusively to these 
political fora, and all channels should either be forced to carry 
such broadcasts or cease transmission during them. 
M. Limits on Campaign Expenditures and Spending 
Limits on campaign contributions and expenditures should be 
imposed in order to "level" the influence of money on politics.109 
Limits of $100 per candidate should be imposed on private contri-
butions by all individuals and organizations to political cam-
paigns.110 Limits should also be placed on the amount of money 
candidates may spend to run for public office. These limits should 
vary according to the office sought, reaching a maximum of 
$100,000 for President of the United States. These same expendi-
ture limits should apply to spending by private individuals or orga-
nizations that spend money directly to endorse or support candi-
dates for public office. No limits, however, should apply to 
spending on speech advancing general political or social causes 
that do not directly advance the candidacies of specific persons.111 
109 For treatments of the topic of political contribution and expenditure regulation, see 
William Patton and Randall Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The 
Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis L Rev 494; Lillian R. BeVier, Money and 
Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal L 
Rev 1045 (1985); Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functional-
ist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 NYU L Rev 
1273, 1354-78 (1983); Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption 
(Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983); Joel L. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of 
Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971, 51 NC L Rev 389 (1973); Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments: The Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 Duke L J 851; Symposium, 
Money in Politics: Political Campaign Finance Reform, 10 Hastings Const L Q 463 (1983); 
Symposium, Political Action Committees and Campaign Finance, 22 Ariz L Rev 351 (1980); 
Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and 
Opportunities, 56 Fordham L Rev 53 (1987); Note, Equalizing Candidates Opportunities 
for Expression, 51 Geo Wash L Rev 113, 195-97 (1982); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional 
Choices 195-97 (Harvard University Press, 1985). Many of the observations in this section 
are drawn from Rodney A. Smolla, When Money Talks: Corporate Campaign Expenditures 
and the First Amendment, in 1991 Free Speech Yearbook 31; Rodney A. Smolla, Free 
Speech in an Open Society 220-39 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992). 
"" The Coalition believes that money has had a corrupting influence on politics, and is 
a primary cause of many of the nation's current policy ills. See, generally, Daniel H. Lowen-
stein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice The-
ory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L Rev 505 (1982); John S. Shockley, Direct De-
mocracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and 
Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U Miami L Rev 377 (1985). 
"' Implementation of these proposals would require modification of existing First 
Amendment doctrines. See, for example, Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 1 (upholding campaign 
contribution limitations but finding expenditure limitations unconstitutional). See also Fed-
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III. THE DAILY GoAL: A TRUTHFUL, CoMPREHENSIVE, AND 
INTELLIGENT AcCOUNT OF THE DAY'S EVENTS IN A CONTEXT 
THAT GIVES THEM MEANING 
The Coalition believes that the press must work harder at sep-
arating "fact" from "opinion" in its reporting and at placing events 
in context. "It is no longer enough to report the fact truthfully," 
the Hutchins Commission observed.112 "It is now necessary to re-
port the truth about the fact." 118 It should be pointed out that 
many journalists who testified before the Coalition objected to this 
passage in the Hutchins Commission Report. To call on journalists 
to report "the truth about the fact," some witnesses claimed, is 
meaningless, because it insinuates into the. task of reporting a cer-
tain pretentiousness about "the truth" that is often both unrealis-
tic and inappropriate. Who in the world, let alone the press corps, 
is able to speak with total self-confidence about "the truth" in 
breaking events in Berlin, South Africa or Los Angeles? 
The Coalition believes, however, that it is merely asking that 
the press do more than present cold facts, or the party line, or a 
government's official propaganda, requiring it instead to present 
events from multiple perspectives using powers of analysis and in-
terpretation to try to arrive at the best provisional understanding 
of events. This task is both within the grasp of good reporters and 
highly desirable for society.U" 
eral Election Commission v Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc., 479 US 238 (1986); Austin 
v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990). 
The Buckley Court rejected the argument that campaign contributions, like draft card 
burning, could be regulated as conduct rather than speech. 424 US at 15-16. Nonetheless, 
commentators have argued that the Court failed to articulate a rationale for this conclusion. 
See BeVier, 73 CalL Rev at 1057-58 (cited in note 109) ("The Court's assertion in Buckley 
that '[t]he expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction 
of a draft card' is flawed because it rests upon a specious distinction between conduct and 
speech. As was true with the draft card burning in [United States v] O'Brien [391 US 367 
(1968)], the speech and conduct involved in campaign contributions and expenditures re-
present an undifferentiated whole."). 
"" Hutchins Report at 22 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original). 
113 Id (emphasis in original). 
114 The Coalition notes that some press representatives argued that the press's perform-
ance today is exemplary, and that attacks on the shallowness of media coverage of major 
issues and events is elitist and exaggerated. One witness thus presented written testimony 
that claimed, in pertinent part: 
It may well be true that many are dissatisfied with the breadth or depth of a 
typical half-hour news broadcast by one of the three major television broadcast 
networks. But for people who want more than this, more is available. One can 
listen to National Public Radio. (The Supreme Court helped secure additional 
editorial independence for public broadcasters in 1984, striking down a provision 
in the Public Broadcasting Act that prohibited editorializing. See FCC v League 
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.Some press representatives balked even at this "assignment," 
asserting that it would necessarily entail blurring of the sharp line 
between "fact" and "opinion" upon which the Hutchins Commis-
sion had earlier insisted. These witnesses claimed that it is simply 
impossible to place events in context, impossible to collate, organ-
ize, and synthesize disparate perspectives and bits of information, 
without engaging in characterization, judgments about credibility, 
and interpretative assessments of history, economics, culture, and 
politics. If the journalist, these witnesses claimed, is being asked to 
prepare a first draft of history, then the journalist must be J>ermit-
ted to do what historians do. · 
To make matters even more complex, the Coalition was beset 
with a highly confusing body of conflicting testimony of the mean-
ing and relevance of the distinction between "fact" and "opinion" 
as it exists in current libel and related First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The distinction between "fact" and "opinion" remains one 
of the more vexing features of contemporary libel law, rendered all 
the more confusing by the Supreme Court's opinion in Milkovich v 
Lorain Journal Co. m In Milkovich, the Supreme Court refused to 
recognize a wholesale defamation exemption for the expression of 
"opinion."116 Instead, the Court limited the protection of "opinion" 
to statements regarding issues of public concern, thus endorsing 
the common law "fair comment" privilege.117 Many press witnesses 
of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364 (1984).) People with access to cable 
will normally be able to supplement or substitute network coverage with CNN, C-
Span, or PBS. One may be lucky enough to have a local newspaper that provides 
excellent political coverage and a strong op-ed page. And in almost every commu-
nity in the country, the local newsstand, bookstore, or drugstore will carry many 
of the great newspapers in the United States, and scores of magazines represent-
ing virtually all points on the political spectrum. It is, in short, my impression that 
political and news junkies do not have difficulty obtaining their daily 
fixes-whether their drug is "hard news" or commentary. 
Testimony of Alice Randolph, on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters. 
110 497 us 1 (1990). 
118 Id at 18. 
117 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis in Milkovich by reviewing the common 
law rules of defamation, including the contours of the fair comment defense. Significantly, 
Rehnquist's recitation of the common law doctrines acknowledged that because "unduly 
burdensome defamation laws could stifle valuable public debate, the privilege of 'fair com-
ment' was incorporated into the common law as an affirmative defense to an action for 
defamation." ld at 13. Fair comment, he observed, provided legal immunity for the honest 
expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true or 
privileged statement of fact. ld. The Chief Justice emphasized that fair comment "was gen-
erally privileged when it concerned a matter of public concern, was upon true or privileged 
facts, represented the actual opinion of the speaker, and was not made solely for the pur-
pose of causing harm." 497 US at 13-14. "According to the majority rule, the privilege of fair 
comment applied only to an expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact, 
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accused the Coalition of disingenuously attempting to exploit the 
Milkovich holding-which was widely perceived as a "defeat" for 
the press. 
IV. THE ULTIMATE GoAL: THE PRESENTATION AND CLARIFICATION 
OF THE GOALS AND VALUES OF SOCIETY 
As the Hutchins Commission lamented, in reporting the fail-
ings and achievements of the day, the press often· fails to assist 
society in the long-term presentation and clarification of its 
goals.118 The Coalition heard testimony from many representatives 
of the press who asked whether society wants the press, in its own 
voice, to project and clarify goals of society. It was questioned 
whether this agenda is compatible with efforts to make presenta-
tion of news as objective as possible, or with the role of the press as 
a common carrier for debate. 119 
Other press witnesses maintained that there is nothing con-
tained within this objective that society should want from the 
press that is not already included within the other objectives the 
Coalition advances. Journalists cannot do it all, and to ask them to 
do too much is to threaten the integrity of their product and dilute 
their function. There is a cultural system of checks and balances at 
work here, a notion of institutional separation of powers. Society's 
journalists are not meant to be its governors, or even its philoso-
phers. News organizations do, of course, editorialize, and in that 
sense contribute as "players in the marketplace" in the general so-
cietal effort to define long-term policy. But if the Coalition has in 
mind a "presenting and clarifying function" any more ambitious 
than this, many press representatives argued, it is asking too 
much. Nonetheless, if news organizations simply meet the goals of 
placing events in context, in deepening our understanding of the 
whether it was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion." Id at 14, quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 at 171 (1976). "Thus under the common law, the privi-
lege of 'fair comment' was the device employed to strike the appropriate balance between 
the need for vigorous public discourse and the need to redress injury to citizens wrought by 
invidious or irresponsible speech." ld. 
118 Hutchins Report at 27 n 2 (cited in note 2). 
118 Some press representatives went even further, taking issue with the whole notion 
that anything called "the press" or "the media" even exists. These witnesses argued that 
there is no such thing as a unified "press" that has some sort of composite personality and 
social function, infused with moral obligation, and validly made subject to the force and 
sanction of law. This, one witness argued, "is a utopian vision, and like so many utopian 
visions, terrifying in its implications." The witness went on to lament that "[c]ertainly the 
idealized image of the press captured by Coalition Platform is a far cry from what the 
American press today is. And it is a far cry from what it ought to be." 
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unfamiliar, in bridging social and economic chasms among differ-
ent groups, and in providing an open forum for debate, they will 
meet our modest demands. 
The Coalition was helped substantially in its thinking by this 
testimony, and its recommendations are not meant to be under-
stood as asking of the press anything more dramatic than these 
press representatives concede to be appropriate. But even when 
measured against this more modest standard, the Coalition is con-
vinced that the press today does not fulfill this obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Coalition is not so arrogant or presumptuous to assume 
that in all details and particulars the blueprint for change sug-
gested above is the best for society. The Coalition is convinced, 
however, that the policy choices. reflected in this blueprint point 
the way toward a more rational and humane conception of freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press in a contemporary democracy. 
As a society, we must determine the appropriate mix of individual 
liberty and social responsibility that we as citizens demand of one 
another and of our institutions. Modern First Amendment juris-
prudence, and modern conceptions by journalists of their role in 
society, have tended overwhelmingly to emphasize the libertarian 
and individualistic strains of our national traditions, and under-
emphasize values of social responsibility and community. The Coa-
lition is convinced that the time has come to bring First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and our expectations of the press, into a more 
sensible balance of liberty and responsibility. The blueprint for 
change outlined in the Coalition's efforts point the way toward a 
marketplace of ideas better grounded in the moral values from 
which free speech and press are ultimately derived, a marketplace 
that performs better in providing a truthful and accurate account 
of the events of the day, that provides a more thoughtful forum for 
the exchange of opinion, that more honestly projects the exper~ 
iences and attitudes of various groups within society to one an-
other, and that helps to present and clarify the goals and aspira-
tions of our democratic society. 
